USA v. Robert Franz by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-4-2014 
USA v. Robert Franz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Robert Franz" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 1127. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/1127 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 
PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-2406 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT FRANZ, 
                Appellant  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 12-cr-00003-1) 
District Judge:  Honorable Berle M. Schiller 
_______________ 
 
Argued 
September 9, 2014 
 
Before:   FISHER, JORDAN, and HARDIMAN Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 4, 2014) 
_______________ 
 
 2 
 
Richard Q. Hark   [ARGUED] 
Hark & Hark 
1835 Market Street, Suite 2626 
Philadelphia, PA   19103 
          Counsel for Appellant 
 
Alicia M. Freind   [ARGUED] 
Robert A. Zauzmer 
Office of United States Attorney 
615 Chestnut Street - #1250 
Philadelphia, PA   19106 
          Counsel for Appellee 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Robert Franz appeals from his conviction in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
on one count of receipt of child pornography in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).  The appeal requires us to decide 
whether the exclusionary rule applies when agents executing 
an otherwise-valid search warrant fail to provide to the 
homeowner a list of items sought.  The appeal also raises 
questions about a separate warrant for the search of Franz’s 
computer and about several evidentiary issues, including 
whether evidence that was shown to the jury but later stricken 
from the case was prejudicial and whether the remaining 
evidence was sufficient to send the case to the jury.  We will 
affirm. 
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I. Background 
 
In 2009, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) 
learned that Franz may have stolen a wooly mammoth tusk 
and other paleontological items from BLM-managed land in 
Alaska and smuggled them to his house in Plymouth Meeting, 
Pennsylvania.  The BLM’s interest in Franz arose while it 
was conducting an investigation of Equinox Wilderness 
Expeditions (“Equinox”), an outfitting and wilderness-guide 
business suspected of taking expeditions onto protected BLM 
land without obtaining proper permits or abiding by BLM 
regulations.  The Equinox website displayed several 
photographs from previous expeditions, including one 
showing Franz posing with the fossilized mammoth tusk.     
 
As part of the BLM’s investigation into Equinox, it 
sent an undercover agent to participate in one of Equinox’s 
expeditions in June 2009.  Franz participated in that trek, and 
the undercover agent interacted with him on several 
occasions.  Franz volunteered that he had gone on fourteen 
prior Arctic expeditions since 1988, including four with 
Equinox.  He also noted his appearance on the Equinox 
website, pointing out that he was “the one holding the 
mammoth tusk.”  (App. at 75.)  He elaborated that he had a 
36-inch mammoth tusk and a 6- to 8-inch mammoth tusk 
from earlier trips, both on display in his house.  Franz 
conveyed to the undercover agent his ideas on the importance 
of memorializing their trip, and he offered to collect 
photographs from the participants in the expedition and 
assemble a compact disc to send to all of the participants.  
Based on the evidence obtained from the undercover 
investigation and from the website, the BLM sought a search 
warrant for Franz’s house.   
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A.  The Nardinger Warrant 
 
 With the assistance of federal prosecutors, BLM Agent 
Joseph Nardinger prepared the warrant application.  Where 
the face sheet of the warrant asked for a description of the 
property that the agents expected to seize, it read, “See 
attached sheet.”  One of the attachments, Attachment B, listed 
a series of items to be seized,
1
 including the mammoth tusks, 
other illegal artifacts, maps of Alaska, financial records, 
photographs, emails, and any related information contained 
on computer hard drives or other electronic storage devices.  
A magistrate judge approved the warrant (the “Nardinger 
Warrant”) on July 30, 2009.  The United States Attorney 
moved to seal the search warrant, affidavit, and 
accompanying papers, citing “the government’s interest in 
protecting cooperating witnesses, maintaining the secrecy of 
grand jury investigations, and ongoing criminal 
investigations.”  (App. at 66.)  The magistrate judge granted 
the motion.     
 
 BLM agents executed the warrant on August 3, 2009.  
Franz was present at the time, and Nardinger provided Franz 
with a copy of the face sheet of the warrant.  He did not, 
however, give him copies of the warrant attachments, even 
when Franz requested them.  Nardinger mistakenly believed 
that, because the warrant and affidavit had been sealed, he 
could not reveal those attachments.  Nardinger nonetheless 
explained to Franz the circumstances giving rise to the 
warrant, including the allegation of stealing a mammoth tusk 
                                              
1
 Attachment A contained a detailed description of 
Franz’s house.   
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from protected lands, and he thoroughly described the items 
the warrant authorized him to seize.     
 
 During the search, agents noticed that on the walls of 
Franz’s house were several framed photographs of young, 
nude girls.  And, while searching for other items listed in 
Attachment B, agents came across pamphlets containing 
several images of nude minors engaged in sexually explicit 
conduct.
2
   After consulting federal prosecutors for guidance, 
the agents collected the contraband in plain view.  One of the 
agents briefly examined Franz’s computer to determine 
whether it had too many files to search on site and whether 
the files were encrypted.  In doing so, he noticed a file 
thumbnail depicting a partially nude girl and saw another file 
name that suggested the presence of child pornography.  The 
agents seized, among other things, the pamphlets, the 
computer, and an external hard drive.  They then referred the 
child pornography case to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(“FBI”).     
 
 B.  The Herrick Warrant 
 
On August 12, 2009, FBI Special Agent Brian Herrick 
obtained a warrant (the “Herrick Warrant”) to search the 
digital storage devices and other items that the BLM had 
                                              
2
 Franz refers to the evidence as “pamphlets,” and the 
government refers to the same items as “magazines.”  
(Appellant’s Opening Br. at 12; Government’s Br. at 6.)  The 
District Court generally adopted Franz’s characterization, 
although it sometimes referred to the items as picture books 
or magazines.  For simplicity and consistency with the 
District Court, we refer to them as pamphlets. 
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seized.  The Herrick Warrant was sealed, and the government 
did not move to unseal it or provide a copy to Franz until 
thirty-one months after issuance and over two months after 
Franz’s indictment in the present case.  The search conducted 
pursuant to the Herrick Warrant produced two digital images 
found on Franz’s external hard drive that, along with the 
pamphlets, served as the basis for the charges in the present 
case: an image labeled 2024372669.jpg (the “202.jpg image”) 
and one labeled 196667053.jpg (the “196.jpg image”).   
 
C.  Indictments and the Motion to Suppress 
 
 In August 2010, Franz was charged with theft of 
government property and conspiracy to defraud the United 
States because of his smuggling of the tusk.  He eventually 
pled guilty to those charges and did not challenge either 
warrant in that case.  Then, on January 5, 2012, a grand jury 
indicted him for two child pornography crimes: receipt of 
child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and 
(b)(1); and possession of child pornography in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).   
 
In the ensuing prosecution, Franz filed a motion to 
suppress all evidence collected pursuant to both the Nardinger 
and Herrick Warrants.  Among other things, he argued that 
the Nardinger Warrant failed to satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment’s particularity requirement.  The District Court 
concluded the warrant was valid at the time it was issued; 
however, the Court also ruled that because Nardinger did not 
provide Franz with Attachment B to the warrant, which 
described the items to be seized, the warrant was facially 
invalid when it was executed.  The Court went on to consider 
the possible deterrent effect that would be achieved by 
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excluding the evidence in this case and decided that the 
exclusionary rule did not apply.  It based its decision on 
Nardinger’s behavior.  Specifically, the Court noted that 
Nardinger consulted with the United States Attorney’s Office 
in deciding which documents the government would seek to 
seal, he verbally described to Franz the items to be searched 
for and seized when executing the warrant, and he allowed 
Franz to be present during the search.  The Court also noted 
that the warrant was the first that Nardinger had ever prepared 
or executed.  Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the 
Court determined that Nardinger had no intention to 
wrongfully conceal the purpose of the search and that the 
decision to withhold the attachments was a “reasonable 
misunderstanding” based in part on unclear language in the 
sealing order.  Therefore, the Court concluded, no appreciable 
deterrent effect would be gained by applying the exclusionary 
rule.   
 
Franz challenged the Herrick Warrant based on a lack 
of particularity and probable cause, and he argued that it was 
tainted by the problems with the Nardinger Warrant.  The 
District Court ruled that the Herrick Warrant appeared valid 
on its face and that, even if the Nardinger Warrant were 
invalid, the exclusionary rule did not require suppression of 
evidence obtained pursuant to the Herrick Warrant.  
Importantly, Franz’s motion to suppress did not include the 
argument he now advances on appeal: namely, that the 
government’s failure to provide Franz with a copy of the 
Herrick Warrant and an inventory until thirty-one months 
after it was executed violated his due process rights and Rule 
41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Franz 
advanced that argument in a motion for reconsideration, 
which the District Court denied.  
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D.  Trial 
 
 Franz’s trial began on February 11, 2013.  The 
government presented the two digital images found on 
Franz’s external hard drive: the 202.jpg image, proffered as to 
the receipt charge; and the 196.jpg image, proffered as to the 
possession charge.  Donald Justin Price testified for the 
government as an expert witness in computer forensics.  He 
stated that he found a deleted internet browser history 
showing that a user who logged in as “Robert Franz” viewed 
the 202.jpg image on the internet (App. at 776-78, 807), and 
later viewed it on Franz’s computer in a folder named 
“Downloads” (App. at 778-80).  Price explained that the 
202.jpg image was also “found in a folder named ‘Internet 
Downloads 14’” on Franz’s external hard drive.  (App. at 
770.)  He further testified that an external hard drive would 
not automatically name folders or files or assign them 
numbers.  On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited 
testimony from Price that, in theory, the image file could have 
come from anywhere, such as a thumb drive or compact disc.  
Nevertheless, Price said that the most likely scenario was that 
someone viewed it in a web browser and then downloaded 
and copied it to the external hard drive.  He gave similar 
testimony regarding the 196.jpg image, noting that he found it 
“on the external hard drive in a folder called, ‘Internet 
Downloads 5.’”  (App. at 771.)   
 
The government also called as a witness Special Agent 
James Wines from the FBI Child Exploitation Task Force in 
New Haven, Connecticut.  He testified that he knew the 
identity of the girl depicted in the 202.jpg image and that he 
had actually met with her.  He also testified that he knew the 
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identity of the person who took the picture.  The photograph 
in question, he said, was taken in a bedroom in Greenwich, 
Connecticut, when the girl was between nine and eleven years 
old, and it was subsequently uploaded to the internet.   
 
Prior to trial, the government had filed a motion in 
limine to admit the two pamphlets as evidence for the 
possession charge.  On the back cover of each pamphlet was 
the following inscription: 
 
 Printed in Denmark 
Copyright 1973 
 Color Climax Corporation 
 Kastrupvej 124 
2300 Copenhagen S 
Denmark 
 
(App. at 534.)  One of the elements of the crime of possession 
is that the images at issue have traveled in interstate or 
foreign commerce.  18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).  The 
government argued that the publication information noted on 
the pamphlets was sufficient to meet that requirement.  The 
government also argued that the pamphlets were self-
authenticating, see Fed. R. Evid. 902(7),
3
 and admissible 
                                              
3
 Rule 902 states, in part, “The following items of 
evidence are self-authenticating; they require no extrinsic 
evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted: … (7) Trade 
Inscriptions and the Like.  An inscription, sign, tag, or label 
purporting to have been affixed in the course of business and 
indicating origin, ownership, or control.”  Fed. R. Evid. 
902(7). 
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under an exception to the rule against hearsay, see Fed. R. 
Evid. 807(a).
4
 
 
 Franz objected to the motion in limine, but the District 
Court granted the government’s motion and allowed it to 
present the pamphlets to the jury.  The government displayed 
selected images from the pamphlets to the jury using an 
overhead projector and also provided a German-language 
expert as a witness to testify that the language on the front of 
the pamphlets was German and that signs visible in the 
images were in German.  No witness, however, was able to 
prove any additional link to Germany or Denmark beyond the 
language and the printed inscriptions.   
 
After closing arguments, Franz sought acquittal, 
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish the 
elements of the crimes charged.  Regarding the two 
pamphlets, Franz argued that the government failed to 
provide sufficient evidence that they had moved in interstate 
                                              
4
 Rule 807 is the so-called “residual exception” to the 
hearsay rule and allows for the admission of hearsay under 
the following circumstances: 
(1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness; (2) it is offered as 
evidence of a material fact; (3) it is more 
probative on the point for which it is offered 
than any other evidence that the proponent can 
obtain through reasonable efforts; and (4) 
admitting it will best serve the purposes of these 
rules and the interests of justice. 
Fed. R. Evid. 807(a). 
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commerce.  The Court denied the motion for judgment of 
acquittal but agreed that the pamphlets should be struck from 
the record.  Therefore, only the two digital images, one 
supporting each count of the indictment, remained as 
evidence.  
 
Immediately after ruling on the motion for judgment of 
acquittal, the Court informed the jury of its decision and 
stated that the pamphlets were no longer in evidence: 
 
I’ve also granted a motion by the defense to 
exclude the two pamphlets that you saw 
because there was no proof of interstate 
commerce as to those two pamphlets, which the 
law requires in this kind of case. We heard the 
agent get on the stand and say they couldn’t 
verify that this came in interstate commerce and 
so on. The only thing was a copyright with no 
way of knowing who printed it, what was – and 
that, to me, is too tenuous a thread, so those two 
pamphlets are out of the case. 
 
(App. at 845-46.)  At Franz’s request, the Court then modified 
the verdict form, striking the portion of the form related to the 
possession charge insofar as it referred to the pamphlets, and 
leaving for that charge only a subpart that referred to the 
second computer image, 196.jpg.   
 
 Again at Franz’s request, the District Court gave 
further instructions regarding the pamphlets in its final charge 
to the jury.  First, it instructed the jury not to let the content of 
any photographic evidence stir passion or prejudice against 
Franz.  The Court said, 
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Various photographs were admitted in evidence.  
You should not let the content stir up your 
emotions to the prejudice of the Defendant.  
Your verdict must be based on a rational and 
fair consideration of all the evidence and not on 
passion or prejudice against the Defendant, the 
Government, or anyone else connected with the 
case. 
 
(App. at 878.)  The Court immediately followed that 
instruction with a charge to disregard the pamphlets in 
reaching its decision: 
 
I have ordered that all testimony concerning the 
pamphlets or magazines [be] stricken from the 
record.  This is not proper evidence in this case.  
You must disregard it entirely.  Do not consider 
this evidence, including the images contained in 
the pamphlets or magazines in reaching your 
decision.   
 
(Id.)  The Court then clarified the evidentiary bases of the 
remaining charges in the case: 
 
At the beginning of the trial I described the 
charges against the Defendant.  At this time, the 
charge of possession of the pamphlets or 
magazines is no longer before you. … You 
should not consider or be concerned with, nor 
should you speculate about the reason the 
charges are no longer part of this trial.  The 
Defendant is on trial only for the receipt and 
possession of the computer images.  You may 
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consider the evidence presented in the case only 
as it relates to the remaining charges. 
 
(Id.)  Franz moved for a mistrial on the basis of the pamphlets 
being shown to the jury, and, when that was denied, he asked 
the District Court to repeat the curative instructions.  The 
Court denied that request but noted that the jury would have 
copies of the curative instructions with them.   
 
 After deliberation, the jury found Franz guilty of 
receipt of child pornography and not guilty of possession of 
child pornography.
5
  Following trial, Franz again moved for 
                                              
5
 It may seem logically inconsistent that Franz was 
convicted of receipt of child pornography and, at the same 
time, acquitted of possession.  Indeed, our sister circuits have 
recognized that possession of child pornography under 
§ 2252(a)(4)(B) is a lesser-included offense of receipt of child 
pornography under § 2252(a)(2).  United States v. Benoit, 713 
F.3d 1, 14 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Brown, 701 F.3d 
120, 127-28 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Muhlenbruch, 
634 F.3d 987, 1003-04 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Schales, 546 F.3d 965, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2008); see also 
United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 64 n.10, 71-72 (3d Cir. 
2008) (concluding that possession of child pornography under 
§ 2252A(5)(B), which is “materially identical” to possession 
under § 2252(a)(4)(B), is the lesser-included offense of 
receipt of child pornography under § 2252A(a)(2), which is 
“materially identical” to receipt under § 2252(a)(2) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  But any seeming inconsistency is 
explained by the manner in which the government chose to 
present the case, tying each digital image to a specific charge.  
The possession charge on which Franz was acquitted was 
 14 
 
judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial, 
both of which the Court denied.  On May 13, 2013, the Court 
sentenced Franz to sixty months imprisonment, five years of 
supervised release, and a $10,000 fine.  This timely appeal 
followed.   
 
II. Discussion6 
 
On appeal, Franz challenges the District Court’s denial 
of his motion to suppress and his motions for judgment of 
acquittal or for a new trial.  Those challenges, while not 
without some persuasive force, ultimately fail.  
 
A. The Nardinger Warrant and the Motion to  
 Suppress
7
 
 
The Nardinger Warrant was facially valid when issued 
but the execution of it violated Franz’s Fourth Amendment 
rights because, as presented to Franz, it did not contain a 
particularized list of items to be seized.  See Bartholomew v. 
Pennsylvania, 221 F.3d 425, 429-30 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(“[G]enerally speaking, where the list of items to be seized 
                                                                                                     
based on conduct separate from that underlying the charge for 
receipt. 
6
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231; we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
7
 We “review[] the District Court’s denial of a motion 
to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual 
findings and exercise[] plenary review of the District Court’s 
application of the law to those facts.”  United States v. Perez, 
280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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does not appear on the face of the warrant, sealing that list, 
even though it is ‘incorporated’ in the warrant, would violate 
the Fourth Amendment.”).  The question before us is thus not 
whether there was a constitutional violation; there was.
8
  The 
question is whether that violation necessitates the suppression 
of the evidence obtained pursuant to the Nardinger Warrant.   
 
Franz contends that the constitutional defect in the 
execution of the warrant rendered it facially invalid and that 
no further analysis is required or allowed.  Based on the 
comment in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), that 
“a warrant may be so facially deficient – i.e., in failing to 
particularize the place to be searched or the things to be 
seized – that the executing officers cannot reasonably 
presume it to be valid[,]” id. at 923, Franz argues that the 
exclusionary rule applies without exception to facially invalid 
warrants.  He says that the District Court erred by looking 
beyond the facial invalidity of the warrant and assessing 
Nardinger’s culpability.  He further argues that, even if 
culpability is considered, the exclusionary rule should still 
apply because Nardinger acted deliberately, in consultation 
with federal prosecutors.   
 
                                              
8
 The government concedes a “mistake” was made in 
light of Bartholomew.  (Government’s Br. at 18.)  But it 
argues that Bartholomew was wrongly decided.  We need not 
spend time on that argument; sitting as a panel of this Court, 
we cannot overrule prior precedent.  Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 
90 F.3d 854, 858 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[A] panel of this court is 
bound by, and lacks authority to overrule, a [precedential] 
decision of a prior panel … .”). 
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We disagree and hold that there is no need to exclude 
evidence based on Nardinger’s mistake in failing to present 
Attachment B to Franz in executing the warrant.
9
  More 
particularly, we reject Franz’s argument that a good-faith 
analysis is unnecessary.  While our case law may not always 
have been clear on the need to consider good faith,
10
 see 
United States v. Graves, 951 F. Supp. 2d 758, 769-71 & n.5 
(E.D. Pa. 2013) (discussing Virgin Islands v. John, 654 F.3d 
412 (3d Cir. 2011), United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140 (3d 
Cir. 2010), and United States v. Wright, 493 F. App’x 265 (3d 
Cir. 2012)), both the Supreme Court’s precedents and our 
own have been consistent in requiring a case-specific analysis 
of whether the exclusionary rule applies, rather than a 
categorical approach. 
                                              
9
 Although Attachment A was also withheld, Franz 
challenges only the withholding of Attachment B.  We limit 
our discussion accordingly. 
10
 A circuit split also exists on the issue of whether an 
officer’s culpability is relevant to an exclusionary rule 
analysis when dealing with a facially invalid warrant.  
Compare United States v. Lazar, 604 F.3d 230, 237-38 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (holding that a culpability analysis does not apply 
when dealing with a facially invalid warrant), with United 
States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 64-66 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding 
that “[n]ot every facially deficient warrant … will be so 
defective that an officer will lack a reasonable basis for 
relying on it”), United States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830, 838 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (same), United States v. Hamilton, 591 F.3d 1017, 
1028-29 (8th Cir. 2010) (same), and United States v. Otero, 
563 F.3d 1127, 1133-34 (10th Cir. 2009) (same). 
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The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  U.S. Const. 
amend. IV.  The exclusionary rule is a prudential doctrine 
designed to enforce the Fourth Amendment by deterring law 
enforcement from unreasonable searches and seizures.  The 
rule achieves that end by preventing the government from 
relying at trial on evidence obtained in violation of the 
Amendment’s strictures.  Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
2419, 2426 (2011); United States v. Katzin, --- F.3d ----, No. 
12-2548, 2014 WL 4851779, at *3 (3d Cir. Oct. 1, 2014) (en 
banc).  Because it comes at the cost of hiding often crucial 
evidence from a fact-finder, though, “[s]uppression of 
evidence … has always been our last resort, not our first 
impulse.”  Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006); 
see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 918 (stating that evidence should 
be suppressed “only in those unusual cases in which 
exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule”).  
 
In determining whether the exclusionary rule applies, 
we engage in a cost-benefit analysis, balancing the 
“deterrence benefits of suppression” against its “‘substantial 
social costs.’”  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (quoting Leon, 468 
U.S. at 907); accord Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 
141 (2009); Leon, 468 U.S. at 910.  “To trigger the 
exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently 
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and 
sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price 
paid by the justice system.”  Herring, 555 U.S. at 144; accord 
Katzin, 2014 WL 4851779, at *4, 17.  In other words, “the 
deterrence benefits of exclusion ‘var[y] with the culpability of 
the law enforcement conduct’ at issue.”  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 
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2427 (alteration in original) (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 
143).  When law enforcement “exhibit[s] ‘deliberate,’ 
‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard for Fourth 
Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong 
and tends to outweigh the resulting costs.”  Id. (quoting 
Herring, 555 U.S. at 144); accord Katzin, 2014 WL 4851779, 
at *4.  Similarly, “the exclusionary rule serves to deter … 
recurring or systemic negligence.”  Herring, 555 U.S. at 144.  
“But when the police act with an objectively reasonable good-
faith belief that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct 
involves only simple, isolated negligence, the deterrence 
rationale loses much of its force, and exclusion cannot pay its 
way.”  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted); Herring, 555 U.S. at 137; accord 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 919; Katzin, 2014 WL 4851779, at *4.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently suggested that the 
absence of culpability is dispositive of the deterrence 
balancing test.  See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428-29 (“[T]his 
acknowledged absence of police culpability dooms Davis’s 
claim.”). 
 
In Leon, the Supreme Court identified several 
scenarios in which officers would not be able to establish an 
objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their actions 
were lawful, including reliance on a facially deficient 
warrant: 
 
[D]epending on the circumstances of the 
particular case, a warrant may be so facially 
deficient – i.e., in failing to particularize the 
place to be searched or the things to be seized – 
that the executing officers cannot reasonably 
presume it to be valid. 
 19 
 
 
468 U.S. at 923.
11
  Franz relies on that language to argue that, 
because the Nardinger Warrant was facially deficient when it 
was presented to him, we should automatically apply the 
exclusionary rule.  Any balancing of costs and benefits has, 
he says, already been performed by the Supreme Court in 
Leon.  But Franz ignores the introductory language in Leon, 
which conditions its discussion “on the circumstances of the 
particular case.”  Id.; see also id. at 918 (noting that 
“suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant 
should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis”). 
 
 The Supreme Court’s recent cases concerning the 
exclusionary rule have focused on the culpability of law 
enforcement officers, as in Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 
                                              
11
 We have paraphrased those scenarios as follows: 
1) where the magistrate judge issued the 
warrant in reliance on a deliberately or 
recklessly false affidavit; 
2) where the magistrate judge abandoned his or 
her judicial role and failed to perform his or her 
neutral and detached function; 
3) where the warrant was based on an affidavit 
so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 
render official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable; or 
4) where the warrant was so facially deficient 
that it failed to particularize the place to be 
searched or the things to be seized. 
Tracey, 597 F.3d at 151. 
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135, 143-45 (2009), and on the knowledge of such officers, as 
in Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428-29 (2011).  
Those cases are not, however, a departure.  The Court’s 
earlier applications of Leon also make clear that a fact-
specific analysis is required and that the need to weigh the 
costs and benefits of exclusion is constant.  So, for example, 
while Leon dealt with a facially valid warrant, 468 U.S. at 
902, the Supreme Court applied the reasoning of Leon to a 
facially deficient warrant in Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 
U.S. 981 (1984), a companion case issued the same day as 
Leon.  Rather than categorically excluding evidence due to 
the facially deficient warrant, the Supreme Court examined 
the circumstances of the case.  Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 989-91.  
The Court focused particularly on the officer’s knowledge 
and actions, including his reliance on the statements of a 
district attorney and the judge who issued the warrant.  Id. at 
989.  The Court ruled that the deterrent purposes of the 
exclusionary rule would not be served by suppression in that 
case.  Id. at 988, 990-91.  The Supreme Court’s application of 
Leon in Sheppard thus forecloses the argument that there is a 
categorical rule that automatically resolves the question of 
suppression when there is a facially deficient warrant.
12
 
                                              
12
 Franz ignores Sheppard and instead points to Groh 
v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004), a qualified immunity case in 
which the Supreme Court relied on the “facial deficiency” 
language in Leon to conclude that it would have been clear to 
a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful when he 
executed a warrant that did not contain a particularized list on 
its face and the supporting documents were not incorporated 
by reference.  Id. at 557, 565.  But the Supreme Court did not 
adopt a categorical rule in Groh that ignored the 
reasonableness of the officer’s actions under the 
 21 
 
 
We have, of course, followed the Supreme Court’s 
lead.  In United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2010), 
we addressed the application of the exclusionary rule to a 
case involving a warrant that failed to incorporate an attached 
affidavit that would have cured the warrant’s lack of 
particularity.  Id. at 149.  We stated that the “limited 
exceptions [identified in Leon, including the facially deficient 
warrant exception,] are consistent with the approach taken in 
Herring because each of these circumstances involve conduct 
that is ‘deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent,’ and thus the 
benefits of deterring future misconduct ‘outweigh the costs’ 
of excluding the evidence.”  Id. at 151 (quoting Herring, 555 
U.S. at 141, 144).  We then examined whether the nature of 
the deficiency in the warrant made the warrant “‘so facially 
deficient’ that no reasonable officer could rely on it,” id. at 
152-53, and whether the officer’s actions in obtaining and 
executing the warrant indicated that the deterrent purposes of 
the exclusionary rule would be served, id. at 153.  
                                                                                                     
circumstances.  Rather, the Court considered the “glaring” 
nature of the deficiency and the officer’s knowledge and 
actions – including his preparation of the warrant and the 
department guidelines that would have alerted him to the 
deficiency.  See id. at 563-64.  Thus, the Court rejected the 
officer’s argument that he was simply negligent, and 
concluded that the warrant was “‘so facially deficient – i.e., in 
failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things 
to be seized – that the executing officers cannot reasonably 
presume it to be valid.’”  Id. at 565 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 
923).  Groh does not contradict that an officer’s knowledge 
and actions are important components of a good faith 
analysis. 
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We took a similar approach in Virgin Islands v. John, 
654 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2011), a case involving a warrant 
affidavit that did not support a finding of probable cause to 
search for evidence of the crime listed on the face of the 
warrant.  Id. at 413.  After determining that one of Leon’s 
four scenarios applied, we turned to the culpability of the 
officer, determining that “her behavior was, at a minimum, 
grossly negligent.”  Id. at 420-21.  Most recently, in an en 
banc opinion in a case involving a warrantless search, we 
rejected the argument that a good-faith analysis is applicable 
only in certain situations already identified by the Supreme 
Court.  Katzin, 2014 WL 4851779, at *9-10 (stating that to 
apply the Supreme Court’s precedent in such a limited 
manner would “improperly elevate [the Court’s previous] 
holding[s] above the general good faith analysis from whence 
[they] came”). 
 
Franz’s argument that a facially deficient warrant 
renders Nardinger’s culpability irrelevant thus runs counter to 
numerous cases emphasizing that, in examining the totality of 
the circumstances, we consider not only any defects in the 
warrant but also the officer’s conduct in obtaining and 
executing the warrant and what the officer knew or should 
have known. 
 
 Nardinger’s conduct was, on the whole, objectively 
reasonable.  He sought and obtained a valid warrant and acted 
in consultation with federal prosecutors.  See Sheppard, 468 
U.S. at 989-90 (highlighting as evidence of reasonableness 
the fact that the officer consulted with the district attorney 
and sought a warrant from a neutral magistrate); Katzin, 2014 
WL 4851779, at *15 (same); Tracey, 597 F.3d at 153 
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(same).
13
  The District Court found that Nardinger had “no 
intention of concealing the subject matter of the warrant or 
the information on Attachment B.”  (App. at 21.)  In 
executing the search, Nardinger explained to Franz what 
items the warrant authorized him to search for and seize, and 
the agents did not exceed the scope of that authorization.  See 
Tracey, 597 F.3d at 153 (highlighting as evidence of 
reasonableness that the agent who led the search told the 
occupants what he was authorized to search for and limited 
the search accordingly).  While Franz disputes that the search 
of his home was appropriately limited, he has not established 
and, given the record, cannot establish that the District 
Court’s finding on that point was clearly erroneous.  Finally, 
the District Court concluded that Franz presented no evidence 
that the constitutional violation in question was “recurring or 
systemic.”   Herring, 555 U.S. at 144.  Although Franz argues 
on appeal that “this case is [a] small example of the systemic 
problems in criminal investigatory practices that are 
sanctioned through legal counsel” (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 
5), he has cited no support for that bald assertion.  Here, an 
inexperienced agent made a mistake, but it appears to have 
been only that: an isolated mistake.
14
   
                                              
 
13
 Franz appears to argue that consultation with legal 
counsel somehow makes the officer’s actions more culpable.  
That argument is inconsistent with Sheppard, Katzin, and 
Tracey.  In Katzin, however, we cautioned that we should 
“not place undue weight on this factor” because prosecutors 
are “not neutral judicial officers.”  Katzin, 2014 WL 4851779, 
at *15-16 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
14
 Franz takes issue with the District Court’s finding 
that this was the first warrant that Nardinger had applied for 
and executed.  But Franz has not shown that this finding is 
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 Our conclusion is confirmed by looking at the 
magistrate judge’s order sealing the attachment, which 
Nardinger thought prohibited him from showing the 
attachment to Franz.  The order stated that “agents executing 
the search warrant are authorized, as required by 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(d), to leave a copy of the search warrant 
and a receipt for the property seized with the person searched 
or at the property searched.”  (App. at 68.)  As the District 
Court noted, that language is somewhat unclear, and the 
officer understood from it that he was authorized to leave the 
warrant face sheet and an inventory but not the supporting 
documents.  In Sheppard, the Supreme Court emphasized that 
a reasonable officer should be expected to rely on a judge’s 
assurances that a particular course of action is authorized, not 
to disregard those assurances.  See 468 U.S. at 989-90 (“[W]e 
refuse to rule that an officer is required to disbelieve a judge 
who has just advised him, by word and by action, that the 
warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the search he 
has requested.”).15  Even though Nardinger was mistaken, his 
                                                                                                     
clearly erroneous.     
 
15
 The state of the law is a relevant, though not the 
sole, factor in the deterrence analysis.  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 
2428-29; Leon, 468 U.S. at 919; Katzin, 2014 WL 4851779, 
at *6, 10-17 (“Davis did not begin, nor end, with binding 
appellate precedent. Rather, binding appellate precedent 
informed – and ultimately determined – the Supreme Court’s 
greater inquiry: whether the officers’ conduct was deliberate 
and culpable enough that application of the exclusionary rule 
would ‘yield meaningfu[l] deterrence,’ and ‘be worth the 
price paid by the justice system.’” (quoting Davis, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2428)).  Based on Bartholomew, Nardinger should have 
known that he was required to present Attachment B to Franz, 
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reliance on the sealing order mitigates the blame that 
necessarily follows his error.   
 
 In light of the foregoing, we cannot say that Nardinger 
acted deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence in 
executing the warrant.  Nardinger should have shown the 
attachment to Franz, but that misstep – stemming from his 
inexperience and misunderstanding of the magistrate judge’s 
order – does not mean that he deliberately violated Franz’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.  In short, application of the 
exclusionary rule would provide little deterrent effect and 
would not justify the costs of suppression.  Therefore, we will 
affirm the District Court’s denial of Franz’s motion to 
suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the Nardinger 
Warrant. 
 
                                                                                                     
see 221 F.3d at 429-30 (“[G]enerally speaking, where the list 
of items to be seized does not appear on the face of the 
warrant, sealing that list, even though it is ‘incorporated’ in 
the warrant, would violate the Fourth Amendment.”), despite 
the possibility of rare exceptions to that rule, see id. at 430 
(acknowledging the “rare case” where sealing may be 
justified); United States v. Leveto, 540 F.3d 200, 211-12 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (stating that an overbroad warrant was cured by a 
subsequent search that was limited to the narrower confines 
of the sealed, unattached, unincorporated affidavit).  
However, Nardinger’s “simple, isolated negligence” does not 
warrant the heavy price of exclusion.  See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 
2427-28 (“[W]hen [law enforcement] conduct involves only 
simple, isolated negligence, the deterrence rationale loses 
much of its force, and exclusion cannot pay its way.” (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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 B.  The Herrick Warrant and the Motion to  
  Reconsider 
 
Franz also attacks the Herrick Warrant, which 
authorized a search of the computer drives seized from his 
house.  The Herrick Warrant was sealed, and Franz did not 
receive a copy of it or its supporting documents until March 
2012, thirty-one months after it was executed and just over 
two months after he was indicted for receipt and possession 
of child pornography.  He contends that the failure to serve 
the warrant at the time of the search violated Rule 41(f)(1)(C) 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
16
 and amounted to 
a due process violation, so that the evidence obtained from 
the warrant must be suppressed.   
 
 The government responds that Franz waived his 
challenge to the Herrick Warrant by failing to timely raise it 
before the District Court.  “[A] suppression argument raised 
for the first time on appeal is waived (i.e., completely barred) 
absent good cause.”  United States v. Rose, 538 F.3d 175, 182 
(3d Cir. 2008) (applying Fed. R. Crim. P. 12).  That rule 
applies “not only where the defendant failed to file a 
suppression motion at all in the district court, but also where 
he filed one but did not include the issues raised on appeal.”  
Id. (citing United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 212 (3d Cir. 
2005)).  Furthermore, “[a] fleeting reference or vague allusion 
                                              
16
 Rule 41 states, “The officer executing the warrant 
must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property 
taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the 
property was taken or leave a copy of the warrant and receipt 
at the place where the officer took the property.”  Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 41(f)(1)(C). 
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to an issue will not suffice to preserve it for appeal[.]  Rather, 
a party must unequivocally put its position before the trial 
court at a point and in a manner that permits the court to 
consider its merits.”  United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 
728 (3d Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
 Franz did not challenge the Herrick Warrant based on 
Rule 41 until his motion for reconsideration following the 
District Court’s ruling on his motion to suppress.  Although 
he claims that he raised the issue in the motion to suppress 
itself, that motion challenged the Herrick Warrant based only 
on arguments of a lack of probable cause and a lack of 
particularity.  During the suppression hearing, defense 
counsel elicited testimony from a prosecution witness stating 
that Franz was not served a copy of the warrant until March 
2012, but the defense did not argue at that time that the delay 
amounted to a violation of due process or Rule 41.  At the end 
of the hearing, the District Court asked Franz and the 
government to provide briefing on the meaning of the 
language in both the Nardinger and Herrick Warrants 
authorizing a copy of the warrants to be left with Franz 
pursuant to Rule 41.   
 
 Franz later submitted proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law that included a finding that the Herrick 
Warrant provided “that agents executing the search warrant 
[were] authorized as required by Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 41(d) to leave a copy of the search warrant and 
receipt for the property with the person searched or at the 
property searched.”  (App. at 295.)  Franz also proposed a 
finding that the government had not given him a copy of the 
Herrick Warrant until March 2012.  Franz did not present any 
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legal argument asserting that the delay constituted a basis for 
relief.  Nor did he propose any legal conclusions invoking 
Rule 41 or due process.  Rather, he simply proposed a 
conclusion that the Herrick Warrant was a “piggy back 
warrant” that would not have been issued but for the invalid 
Nardinger Warrant.  (App. at 302.)  Therefore, the proposed 
findings did not preserve the issue for appeal because they 
failed to call it to the District Court’s attention and permit the 
Court to rule on the argument as Franz later advanced it in his 
motion for reconsideration.
17
 
 
 The question thus becomes whether Franz’s 
subsequent motion for reconsideration was sufficient to 
preserve the issue for appeal.  In United States v. Dupree, we 
concluded that raising an argument for the first time in a 
motion for reconsideration results in waiver of that argument 
for purposes of appeal.  617 F.3d at 732; see also id. at 738 
(Fisher, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(agreeing with the lead opinion’s waiver analysis regarding 
motions to reconsider).  We held that the government had 
“waived its … argument by failing to raise it before the 
District Court ruled on [the] motion to suppress – i.e., by the 
‘deadline’ set by Rule 12(e).”  Id. at 732 (lead opinion).  
                                              
17
 The government, on the other hand, submitted 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law stating that 
the failure to serve the Herrick Warrant on Franz for thirty-
one months did not constitute a violation of Rule 41(f).  Franz 
did not respond to that point in his reply to the government’s 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Nor did 
Franz respond to that point in a supplemental memorandum, 
which the docket identified as an affidavit, filed after the 
hearing in support of his motion to suppress. 
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Furthermore, the government had not established good cause 
under Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
for failing to raise the theory earlier.
18
  Id.  Under Dupree, 
then, Franz’s Rule 41 and due process arguments are waived 
because he raised them for the first time in his motion for 
reconsideration, and he has not established good cause for his 
failure to raise the arguments earlier.
19
 
                                              
18
 Barring Congressional action to prevent the change, 
the “good cause” exemption now in Rule 12(e) will be 
relocated to subpart (c)(3) of Rule 12, effective December 1, 
2014.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 12 Committee Notes on Rules – 2014 
Amendment.  The amendment also removes any reference to 
“waiver” from what will be subpart (c)(3).  Id.  The parties 
have not raised, and we thus have no occasion to consider, the 
impact of the amendment on our prior holding that Rule 12 
completely bars review.  See Rose, 538 F.3d at 184 
(concluding that plain error review is unavailable given Rule 
12’s explicit use of the term “waiver”). 
 
19
 In Dupree, we concluded that the challenge to the 
initial ruling on the motion to suppress was waived but the 
challenge to the denial of the motion for reconsideration was 
not.  Dupree, 617 F.3d at 732.  Thus, while Franz’s challenge 
to the denial of the suppression motion is unpreserved, we 
may still review the denial of the motion for reconsideration 
to determine whether his Rule 41 and due process arguments 
should be considered.  A motion for reconsideration is “not 
for addressing arguments that a party should have raised 
earlier.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The purpose 
of such motions “is to correct a clear error of law or to 
prevent a manifest injustice in the District Court’s original 
ruling.”  Id.  Here, the District Court ruled that even if the 
Herrick Warrant was tainted by the particularity problems in 
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C.  The Pamphlets and Related Motions
20
 
 
 Next, Franz turns to arguments concerning the two 
pamphlets that the District Court initially admitted but later 
excluded from evidence.  Graphic pictures from the 
pamphlets “depict[ing] children being sexually assaulted” 
(Appellant’s Opening Br. at 45) were displayed to the jury, 
using a projector that enlarged them on a screen.  Franz 
                                                                                                     
the Nardinger Warrant, the exclusionary rule should not apply 
to the Herrick Warrant.  The District Court’s analysis thus 
focused on whether suppressing evidence obtained pursuant 
to the Herrick Warrant would serve to deter the kind of 
particularity problems evident in the Nardinger Warrant as 
presented to Franz.  The requirements of the Due Process 
Clause and the requirement of Rule 41 that a warrant and 
inventory be given “to the person from whom, or from whose 
premises, the property was taken,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 
41(f)(1)(C), do not establish that the District Court’s ruling 
constituted a clear error of law or a manifest injustice.  We 
therefore cannot say that the District Court abused its 
discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration. 
20
 Franz does not frame the issues with precision in this 
part of his argument, but our review is for abuse of discretion, 
regardless of whether our focus is on the District Court’s 
initial evidentiary ruling, its denial of Franz’s motion for a 
mistrial, or its denial of Franz’s motion for a new trial.  See 
United States v. Quinn, 728 F.3d 243, 261 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(new trial), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1872 (2014); United 
States v. Self, 681 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2012) (mistrial); 
United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 537-38 (3d Cir. 
2010) (evidentiary issues). 
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argues that, despite the District Court’s ultimate decision to 
strike the pamphlets from the record, the Court abused its 
discretion when it initially admitted them and allowed images 
from them to be published to the jury.  He contends that, 
despite the curative instructions, the pictures displayed from 
the pamphlets contributed to the guilty verdict on the receipt 
charge because they have “highly reprehensible and offensive 
content which might lead a jury to convict on emotion.”  
(Appellant’s Opening Br. at 45.)     
 
The government responds that showing the images to 
the jury was harmless because the District Court ultimately 
excluded them from evidence and “emphatically and 
repeatedly told the jury not to consider [them].”  
(Government’s Br. at 50.)  The government also argues that 
the split verdict – guilty for receipt of child pornography but 
not guilty for possession, the latter being the only charge 
associated with the pamphlets – indicates that the jury heeded 
the Court’s instructions, thus proving that the admission of 
the pamphlets was harmless.     
 
“‘The test for harmless error is whether it is highly 
probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment.  
This [h]igh probability requires that the court possess a sure 
conviction that the error did not prejudice the defendant.’”  
United States v. Cunningham, 694 F.3d 372, 391-92 (3d Cir. 
2012) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 
Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 540 (3d Cir. 2010)).  The 
government bears the burden of establishing harmlessness.  
United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 515 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 
Regarding the curative instructions, “‘the almost 
invariable assumption of the law [is] that jurors follow their 
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instructions.’”  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 740 
(1993) (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 
(1987)).  Therefore, “‘[we] presum[e] that jurors, conscious 
of the gravity of their task, attend closely the particular 
language of the trial court’s instructions in a criminal case 
and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow the 
instructions given them.’”  Id. (second alteration in original) 
(quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9 (1985)).  
But “[c]ases may arise in which the risk of prejudice inhering 
in material put before the jury may be so great that even a 
limiting instruction will not adequately protect a criminal 
defendant’s constitutional rights.”  Francis, 471 U.S. at 324 
n.9.  Such cases present “extraordinary situations.”  Id.; 
United States v. Lee, 573 F.3d 155, 164 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(identifying the “highly unusual circumstance[]” where the 
improperly admitted evidence “was the missing link in the 
prosecution’s case”).  “The risk that a jury will be unable to 
follow the court’s instruction to ignore information depends 
on a number of factors including the strength of the proper 
evidence against the defendant, the nature of the information, 
and the manner in which the information was conveyed.”  
Lee, 573 F.3d at 163.  “Absent … extraordinary situations, 
however, we adhere to the crucial assumption underlying our 
constitutional system of trial by jury that jurors carefully 
follow instructions.”  Francis, 471 U.S. at 324 n.9. 
 
Here, immediately after the District Court ruled on the 
admissibility of the pamphlets, the Court informed the jury of 
its ruling and stated that the pamphlets were “out of the case.”  
(App. at 845-46.)  Furthermore, at Franz’s request, the Court 
gave several instructions relating to the pamphlets in its final 
charge to the jury.  It first instructed the jury not to let the 
inflammatory nature of the photographic evidence stir up 
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“passion or prejudice.”  (App. at 878.)  The Court 
immediately followed that instruction with a directive to 
disregard the pamphlets “entirely” and not to consider them in 
reaching its decision.  (Id.)  The Court further instructed the 
jury that the possession-of-child-pornography charge based 
on the pamphlets was no longer part of the case and that it 
should only consider the charges of receipt and possession on 
the basis of the computer images: “The Defendant is on trial 
only for the receipt and possession of the computer images.  
You may consider the evidence presented in the case only as 
it relates to the remaining charges.”21  (Id.)  The District 
Court’s curative instructions were thus clear, comprehensive, 
and direct, and, under the circumstances, sufficient to address 
the difficulty presented by the withdrawal of the pamphlets.   
 
We are not unmindful that child pornography cases are 
particularly fraught with the danger of unfair prejudice, even 
before evidence has been admitted, let alone after graphic 
depictions of abuse have been admitted and then withdrawn.  
“Child pornography is so odious, so obviously at odds with 
common decency, that there is a real risk that offenders will 
be subjected to indiscriminate punishment based solely on the 
repugnance of the crime ... .”  United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 
250, 260 (3d Cir. 2007).  But there is no per se rule that juries 
are incapable of following instructions when disturbing 
evidence is involved.  Cf. Cunningham, 694 F.3d at 390-91 
(noting that the admission of videos or images depicting child 
pornography is not per se improper but turns on “the nature 
                                              
21
 While the District Court spoke in terms of 
“remaining charges,” the criminal charges never changed.  
Only the evidence available to prove the charges was 
different, so, to be precise, there was no acquittal. 
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and severity of the acts depicted” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  While a bell as horrifyingly loud as that 
represented by the pamphlet pictures in this case can never be 
un-rung, that does not mean that a jury cannot be trusted to 
focus, and be shown to have focused, on the evidence to 
which it is told to confine its attention.  The role of the district 
court is always to manage the evidence with care 
commensurate with the rights of the public and the person 
being prosecuted.  The Court here did just that, adjusting its 
ruling on the pamphlets’ admissibility as it thought necessary 
to protect the defendant, and instructing the jury accordingly.  
On the present record, it appears highly probable that the 
repulsive nature of the pamphlets did not undermine the 
efficacy of the District Court’s instructions.  Cf. United States 
v. Finley, 726 F.3d 483, 493-94 (3d Cir. 2013) (ruling that the 
probative value of several videos was not outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, even though some of the videos 
were “extremely disturbing and absolutely prejudicial”). 
 
The jury’s split verdict confirms that conclusion in this 
instance.  Whether a split verdict supports or undermines a 
finding of harmless error depends on the circumstances of the 
case.  Compare United States v. Shannon, 766 F.3d 346, 352, 
359-60 (3d Cir. 2014) (concluding, despite a split verdict, that 
the prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s post-arrest silence 
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the 
evidence was “largely circumstantial,” “not ‘overwhelming,’” 
and turned on the credibility of the defendant, which was 
directly undermined by the error), United States v. Price, 13 
F.3d 711, 730-31 (3d Cir. 1994) (concluding that an 
erroneous jury instruction was not harmless regarding one 
defendant because the evidence, “albeit sufficient, was not 
overwhelming,” and noting defendant’s acquittal on the 
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substantive charge in considering the strength of the evidence 
supporting a defendant’s conspiracy conviction), and United 
States v. Riggi, 951 F.2d 1368, 1371-72, 1377 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(concluding that a split verdict did not render a Confrontation 
Clause violation harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
because the testimony “may have been dispositive on some 
counts”), with United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 899 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (stating that “a discriminating acquittal on one of 
the counts” can constitute “evidence that the jury was able to 
overcome any prejudice”).  Cf. Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 
U.S. 73, 87 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“[I]f the erroneous 
instruction was given in connection with an offense for which 
the defendant was acquitted and if the instruction had no 
bearing on the [lesser included] offense for which he was 
convicted, it would be appropriate to find the error 
harmless.”). 
 
Here, the pamphlets were introduced as evidence of 
the possession charge alone.  The verdict form specifically 
indicated what items of evidence supported each count.  The 
District Court struck the portions of the verdict form 
referencing the pamphlets, leaving only the part that 
referenced the 196.jpg image as support for the possession 
charge, and also leaving the receipt charge, which was based 
solely on the 202.jpg image.  When the jury returned its 
verdict, it convicted Franz of receipt of child pornography but 
acquitted him of the possession charge.  In other words, Franz 
was convicted of the charge that the pamphlets were never 
used to support, and he was acquitted of the charge for which 
they were used.  The totality of the circumstances – including 
the manner in which the evidence and charges were presented 
to the jury – strongly suggests that the jury was able to keep 
 36 
 
the evidence and charges separate in their minds and was not 
swayed by the prejudicial character of the pamphlets. 
 
Thus, when the split verdict is viewed in light of the 
relation between the charges and the evidence, as well as the 
District Court’s direct, repeated, and thorough curative 
instructions, we think it fair to say it is highly probable that 
any error in the admission of the pamphlets did not contribute 
to the judgment of guilt on the charge for receipt of child 
pornography.  
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 D.  Sufficiency of the Evidence and the Post-
 Verdict Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
22
 
 Franz’s final set of arguments focus on the District 
Court’s denial of his post-verdict motion for judgment of 
acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
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 “We review de novo an appeal of a district court’s 
ruling on a ‘Rule 29 motion [for judgment of acquittal] and 
independently appl[y] the same standard as the District 
Court.’”  United States v. Freeman, 763 F.3d 322, 343 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (second alteration in original) (quoting United 
States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir. 2006)).  “‘A Rule 
29 motion for judgment of acquittal obliges a district court to 
review the record in the light more favorable to the 
prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact 
could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
based on the available evidence.’”  Id. (quoting Bobb, 471 
F.3d at 494).  “Furthermore, ‘we review the evidence as a 
whole, not in isolation … .’”  United States v. Caraballo-
Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) 
(quoting United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 480 (3d Cir. 
2010)) (discussing the standard for reviewing a post-verdict 
grant of a motion for judgment of acquittal).  Thus, “‘[t]he 
question is whether all the pieces of evidence against the 
defendant, taken together, make a strong enough case to let a 
jury find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  Id. at 432 
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 
F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1977)).  “The evidence does not need 
to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it 
does establish a case from which the jury can find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Cooper, 567 
F.2d at 254 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Procedure.  He contends that the government failed to 
establish three elements regarding the receipt charge: a 
jurisdictional nexus, mens rea, and the sexually explicit 
nature of the digital image.  
   
  1. Jurisdictional Nexus 
 
Section 2252 of the criminal code prohibits the 
knowing receipt of child pornography that has been 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a)(2).
23
  Transportation in interstate or foreign 
                                              
23
 Section 2252(a) provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
 
(a) Any person who – 
… 
“(2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any 
visual depiction using any means or facility 
of interstate or foreign commerce or that has 
been mailed, or has been shipped or 
transported in or affecting interstate or 
foreign commerce, or which contains 
materials which have been mailed or so 
shipped or transported, by any means 
including by computer, … if – 
(A) the producing of such visual 
depiction involves the use of a 
minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct; and  
(B) such visual depiction is of such  
 conduct; 
… 
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commerce – an essential element of the offense – provides the 
“jurisdictional nexus” that allows Congress to criminalize the 
conduct.  United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 244-45 
(3d Cir. 2006).  Downloading images from the internet 
satisfies that element.  Id. at 246 (“[T]he government is not 
required to prove that the child pornography images crossed 
state lines before being downloaded and received by the 
defendant, but rather only must prove that the images were 
downloaded from the Internet, which is properly regulated by 
Congress as a channel and instrumentality of interstate 
commerce … .”).  
 
Franz argues that judgment of acquittal should have 
been granted because the government presented no evidence 
that the 202.jpg image was downloaded from the internet.  He 
argues that the image instead “could have come from any 
external source (thumb drive, [compact disc], or other 
external media).”  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 47.)  
 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government, a rational juror could certainly conclude that the 
government had proven the jurisdictional element beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Price, the government’s computer 
forensics expert, testified that someone using Franz’s 
computer viewed the image on a website and that, on June 9, 
2008, someone viewed the image in a folder called 
“Downloads,” located on his hard drive.  Price further 
testified that, on December 24, 2008, the image was stored to 
                                                                                                     
 shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) 
 of this section. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a). 
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a folder named “Internet Downloads 14” on Franz’s external 
hard drive.  Although not direct proof of the actual download 
itself, Price’s testimony presents circumstantial evidence 
sufficient for a rational juror to conclude that the image was 
in fact downloaded from the internet.  See Caraballo-
Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 425 (“Circumstantial inferences drawn 
from the evidence must bear a ‘logical or convincing 
connection to established fact.’” (quoting United States v. 
Cartwright, 359 F.3d 281, 291 (3d Cir. 2004))); cf. United 
States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 67-69 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(concluding sufficient evidence of knowing receipt existed 
despite the lack of any direct, forensic evidence that images 
had been downloaded on the defendant’s computer or that 
defendant had ever visited child pornography websites). 
 
And if that evidence were not enough, the government 
presented testimony from an investigator establishing that the 
image in question was a photograph taken in Connecticut.  If 
we accept Franz’s alternative theory as true – that the image 
was placed on the external hard drive from a thumb drive or 
compact disc and never downloaded from the internet – the 
image would still have had to get to Pennsylvania from 
Connecticut.  A rational juror thus could have inferred that 
Franz received a “visual depiction … that ha[d] been mailed, 
or ha[d] been shipped or transported in or affecting interstate 
or foreign commerce, or which contain[ed] materials which 
have been mailed or so shipped or transported.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a)(2).  Either way, the District Court did not err in 
denying the motion for judgment of acquittal on the 
jurisdictional element of the receipt charge. 
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2. Mens Rea 
 
 Franz also challenges the element of knowing receipt.  
In United States v. Miller, we identified a number of factors 
relevant to the inquiry of whether receipt of child 
pornography was accomplished knowingly: 
 
(1) whether images were found on the 
defendant’s computer; (2) the number of images 
of child pornography that were found … ; (3) 
whether the content of the images was evident 
from their file names … [;] (4) defendant’s 
knowledge of and ability to access the storage 
area for the images … [; and (5)] the number of 
occasions that the images were copied [or 
downloaded]. 
 
527 F.3d at 67, 69 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Applying those factors, Franz argues that the 
evidence was not sufficient to allow a jury to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that his receipt of the 202.jpg image was 
“knowing.”24  We disagree.  
                                              
24
 Franz also argues that the government was required 
to prove the specific date on which he received the image.  
We reject that argument.  He relies on an unpublished district 
court case that states, without citation to authority, that when 
receipt of child pornography is alleged, “the government [is] 
obliged to prove that the material traveled in interstate 
commerce, and also the date of receipt.”  United States v. 
MacEwan, No. CRIM.A.04-262, 2004 WL 3019316, at *1 n.1 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 445 F.3d 
237 (3d Cir. 2006).  Proof of the specific date of receipt 
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 Two images were found on Franz’s computer.  The 
number is admittedly small, and he may not have known the 
content of the images from file names alone.  But Price 
testified that someone viewed the 202.jpg image on the 
internet and again in Franz’s download folder and then saved 
it to his external hard drive.  That chain of events strongly 
suggests that whoever received the image did so knowingly.  
Cf. United States v. Brown, 862 F.2d 1033, 1037-38 (3d Cir. 
1988) (concluding that evidence of ordering child 
pornography is circumstantial evidence of knowing receipt of 
child pornography).  Price further testified that Franz’s 
computer had one user-created profile, that Franz lived alone, 
and that the image was viewed on the computer when the user 
was logged in as Franz.  Finally, Price testified that the folder 
“Internet Downloads 14” – which was stored on the root drive 
of the external hard drive and would have been visible to 
                                                                                                     
would doubtless strengthen the overall evidentiary picture for 
purposes of establishing the defendant’s mens rea.  But when 
Congress has not identified time as an essential element of an 
offense, “proof of the acts charged on any date within the 
statute of limitations and before the return date of the 
indictment is sufficient to support a conviction.”  United 
States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 745 (3d Cir. 1974) 
(addressing variances between indictment and proof).  
Furthermore, “[b]y the use of the qualifying phrase ‘on or 
about’, the grand jury indicates its unwillingness to pinpoint 
the date of the offense charged.”  Id.  Here, the indictment 
charged Franz with knowing receipt “[o]n or about June 9, 
2008.”  (App. at 44.)  Price testified that someone using 
Franz’s computer viewed the image on a website, and then on 
June 9, 2008, someone viewed the same image on Franz’s 
computer in a folder titled “Downloads.”  That is enough. 
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anyone who used that device – was not created or named by 
default; rather, someone created and named the file folder.  
Thus, three of the five Miller factors (the first, fourth, and 
fifth) point to Franz knowingly receiving the image in 
question.  Because a rational juror could conclude, based on 
that evidence, that Franz knowingly received the image, his 
Rule 29 challenge fails.  Viewing the evidence as a whole, a 
rational jury could – and did – conclude that Franz knowingly 
received the image at issue. 
 
3. Sexually Explicit Conduct 
  
 Finally, Franz challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence to establish that the 202.jpg image was child 
pornography.  That picture is of a nine- to eleven-year-old 
girl, fully nude, sitting on a bed, with her legs spread and her 
genitals exposed.  The minor’s head, arms, and legs are 
cropped from the picture.   
 
 To be guilty of knowing receipt of child pornography, 
the visual depiction must be “of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct.”  18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A), (B).  The 
statute defines “sexually explicit conduct” as including 
“lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any 
person.”  Id. § 2256(2)(A)(v).  In determining whether a 
visual depiction involves “lascivious exhibition of the genitals 
or pubic area,” we have adopted what have come to be called 
the Dost factors: 
 
“1) whether the focal point of the visual 
depiction is on the child’s genitalia or pubic 
area; 2) whether the setting of the visual 
depiction is sexually suggestive, i.e., in a place 
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or pose generally associated with sexual 
activity; 3) whether the child is depicted in an 
unnatural pose, or in inappropriate attire, 
considering the age of the child; 4) whether the 
child is fully or partially clothed, or nude; 5) 
whether the visual depiction suggests sexual 
coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual 
activity; 6) whether the visual depiction is 
intended or designed to elicit a sexual response 
in the viewer.” 
 
United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(quoting United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. 
Cal. 1986), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 
1239 (9th Cir. 1987) and aff’d, 813 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 
1987)).  The sixth factor is not “a separate substantive inquiry 
about the photographs.”  Id. at 125.  Rather, it is simply 
“useful as another way of inquiring into whether any of the 
other five Dost factors are met.”  Id.  Furthermore, “the Dost 
factors are not dispositive and serve only as a guide.”  United 
States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 182 (3d Cir. 2010); see also 
United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 746 n.10 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(“The analysis is qualitative and no single factor is 
dispositive.”).  “In addition to the considerations detailed in 
Dost, we are guided by Black’s Law Dictionary, which 
defines ‘lascivious exhibition’ as a depiction which displays 
or brings forth to view in order to attract notice to the genitals 
and pubic area of children, in order to excite lustfulness or 
sexual s[t]imulation in the viewer.”  Larkin, 629 F.3d at 182 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  “We may also consider 
any other relevant factors given the particularities of the 
case.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 According to Franz, “the setting of the visual depiction 
is not alone sexually suggestive, although the background is 
in a bed room” (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 54); the minor is 
not inappropriately attired considering the age of the child; 
the nature of the pose cannot be determined from the image 
because the child’s head, arms, and legs are cropped from the 
picture; “absent any expression, look, or even gesture the 
depiction can suggest nothing at all,” let alone sexual coyness 
or a willingness to engage in sexual activity (Appellant’s 
Reply Br. at 15); and the picture is not intended or designed 
to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.   
 
 His arguments are wholly unpersuasive.  This is no 
mere baby-in-the-bathtub picture.  Common sense and 
consideration of the Dost factors are enough to lead to the 
conclusion that the picture shows a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct.  First, the focal point of the image 
is the child’s genitals.  Second, the image depicts a child in a 
bedroom, sitting on a bed, thus placing the image in a 
sexually suggestive setting.  Villard, 885 F.2d at 124 
(identifying a bed or mattress as a place commonly associated 
with sexual activity, though that alone is not enough to 
establish lasciviousness).  Third, the child’s legs are spread 
and her genitals exposed, thus depicting a pose often 
associated with sexual activity.  See Knox, 32 F.3d at 747 
(concluding that pictures exhibited sexually explicit conduct 
when, among other things, the minors “were shown 
specifically spreading or extending their legs to make their 
genital and pubic region entirely visible to the viewer”).  
Fourth, although it is true the child is not wearing any 
sexually suggestive clothing, that is because she is wearing 
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nothing at all.
25
  Fifth, sitting on a bed nude with legs spread 
can be understood as suggesting a willingness to engage in 
sexual activity.  Cf. United States v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 33 
(1st Cir. 1999) (concluding that a girl’s posture did not 
demonstrate a willingness to engage in sexual activity 
because, among other facts, “her legs are not widespread”).  
Sixth, all of the facts addressed above suggest that the image 
was intended to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.
26
  
                                              
25
 Franz argues that the image is protected speech – 
rather than child pornography – because it is a “‘depiction[] 
of nudity, without more.’”  (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 16 
(alteration in original) (quoting Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 
103, 112 (1990)); see also Appellant’s Opening Br. at 54.)  
As our discussion of the Dost factors indicates, the image is 
not simply a “depiction[] of nudity, without more.”  Osborne, 
495 U.S. at 112. 
26
 Franz claims that the depiction in this case is similar 
to the one at issue in United States v. Amirault, in which the 
First Circuit concluded that a photograph was not sexually 
explicit because, even though it depicted a minor’s genitals, 
“there is no zooming in on the genitals and the focus is not on 
the genital area.”  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 54.)  Franz’s 
attempt to align his case with Amirault is unavailing.  
Amirault addressed whether “a photograph of a young naked 
female, probably a teenager, standing or kneeling in a hole on 
a beach” depicted “sexually explicit conduct.”  173 F.3d at 
30.  Applying the Dost factors, the First Circuit concluded 
that the photograph did not depict sexually explicit conduct.  
Id. at 33.  The court thrice noted the fact that the girl’s legs 
were not widespread – as it discussed the focus of the 
photograph, the girl’s pose, and whether the girl’s expression 
or posture demonstrated a willingness to engage in sexual 
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 The nature of the 202.jpg image is certainly such that a 
rational juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the image depicted “lascivious exhibition of the genitals or 
pubic area,” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v), and thus satisfied the 
requirement that the image depict “a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct,” id. § 2252(a)(2)(A), (B).  
 
III.  Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of conviction. 
                                                                                                     
activity.  Id.  The court also noted that the setting was “unlike 
a bedroom.”  Id.  Thus, the image in question here is different 
from that discussed in Amirault in significant ways. 
